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BOOK REVIEWS
THE INFLUENCE Or THE AmERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON PUBLIC OPINION AND LEGIS-
LATION. By M. Louise (Mrs. John Brisben) Rutherford. Chicago: The Foundation
Press, Inc. 1937. pp. 393. $3.00.
At a time when many citizens are endeavoring to appraise and to sustain such
independent agencies as can be relied on to help maintain an alert and informed public
opinion, Mrs. Rutherford has published the important study which she presented to
the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Pennsylvania as a part of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Her critical examination of the
record as to what the American Bar Association has done and failed to do since its
founding in 1878 is projected against a background of the state of the world today.
She observes that "the capacity of democratic government to maintain and defend
itself is being questioned" in many lands. She sketches causes, and enumerates one
of them as "the failure to organize services of voluntary groups, especially those
expert in government and law." In overcoming this failure she thinks that there can be
erected agencies which will aid church, home, school and press, in counter-balancing the
forces which seek the ascendancy of arbitrary, personal power in government.
In furtherance of her thesis that "the voluntary services of unbiased experts in
government should be evaluated and used," the author recognizes that "The American
Bar Association may constitute one of these voluntary groups, and this study
represents an effort to obtain facts in relation to what contribution, if any, the Amcrl-
can Bar Association has made and is making in the field of government and ad-
ministration." Her starting-point is expressed in quotation from Mr. Harold J.
Laski's "Politics," that "Effective public opinion for the purpose of government, in a
word, is almost always opinion which is organized and differentiated from that of the
multitude by the possession of special knowledge." Although sensing that such a
group as the American Bar Association could not, if it would, dictate or control public
opinion or determine the votes or views of even its own members, Mrs. Rutherford
finds that "lawyers, because of their training and acquirement of specialized knowledge"
and because of the nation-wide character of the profession and its highly diversified
membership, may well be in a position to assist and implement public opinion in
matters pertaining to the administration of justice, the competent function of demo-
cratic government, and the enforcement of rules of law as obstacles to collectivist
interference with individual rights which are fundamental in a free society. She
trenchantly says:
"Though governmental problems are difficult of solution, yet quacks and Charlatans
are not lacking with their ready remedies. Little is accomplished by ballyhoo. There
are no panaceas, especially for governmental and legal problems; only knowledge and
organization can offer workable solutions."
"There is need of perfecting the democratic process, especially in the fields of law
making, law enforcement, and interpretation * * *. Can the organized Bar be of any
assistance in obtaining efficiency in the functioning of democratic government?"
Although a lawyer, the author says that she "holds no brief for lawyers, individually
or as organized in Bar Associations. The purpose of this study is to gather facts ......
She proclaims that "There is need of factual data regarding the policies and activities
of the American Bar Association because the profession of law represents a public
profession and occupies a strategic position in the government and the society politic."
The underlying point of view and purpose of Mrs. Rutherford's searching study
of the American Bar Association have been quoted at length by this reviewer, as they
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are in a sense as significant and timely as are her accumulation and analysis of data.
From her survey of nearly sixty years of the Association's history, she finds that its
services to the public and the profession have been so numerous and so substantial
that it has on the whole met the tests which she laid down for her survey. In con-
sequence, Mrs. Rutherford ranks the American Bar Association as one of the
representative, independent and highly useful public institutions whose activities may
be a bulwark against extensions of arbitrary power and casual, untrained experimenta-
tion in the processes of government.
Within reasonable limits of space, this review cannot reproduce here the items of
that evaluation or the impressive array of facts with which it is supported. Of out-
standing significance is the revelation that a relatively small part of the work of the
Association is in controverted or contested fields, except as minor special interests or
parochial views may interject themselves as opposing elements. Preponderantly, the
activities of the Association relate to matters in which the expert assistance and
counsel of Association Committees and groups are cordially welcomed and avaled of
and are substantially unopposed. The inference seems warranted that the author
thinks that the Association has been of the greatest usefulness and influence when it
has given active aid to improvement of the administration of justice and to trained
draftsmanship in the processes of legislation. Nevertheless, the Association has
rarely hesitated to speak and act boldly in controversial issues, if the independence of
the administration of justice, the good repute of the profession, or the fundamentals of
free government according to law, appeared to be at stake.
Mrs. Rutherford has not only made competent and exhaustive research among
published and unpublished documents to which she refers categorically in footnotes,
but has also consulted extensively the recollection of many persons identified with the
events which she records. All in all, she has rendered a real service to the public
as well as to the profession of law, and has made a most readable chronicle on a
subject which might have been made deadly dull. It is of minor importance that there
are noteworthy omissions from her summary of the services performed by the Associa-
tion, and that she has adhered steadfastly to facts for which she can cite record
references, even at the cost of failing to catch altogether the spirit and the purposes
which have animated the many activities and are in reality the ultimate test of their
worth. Her study has the demerits as well as the merits of being resolutely factual;
it does not attempt to evaluate the intangibles or the imponderables.
Mrs. Rutherford evidently assembled her data in 1935 and early 1936; her chronicle
speaks as of that time. When the structure of the Association was thoroughly reorgan-
ized and decentralized in August of 1936, she added text and footnotes which told of
the changes. The volume went to press before anyone had opportunity to observe and
analyze the practical effects of the 1936 transition to a representative basis. In par-
ticular, the author had no opportunity to survey and evaluate the extensive use of
referenda, in 1937, as the means of deciding the attitude and action of the Association
upon major questions of policy such as the proposed re-making of the Supreme Court
of the United States; likewise no opportunity to narrate and appraise the functioning
of the new House of Delegates and the substantial results achieved by it during the
first year.
In a vital sense, this volume reviews the record of the Association down to the
close of an epoch in its history. The achievements of which Mrs. Rutherford writes
are those of nearly sixty years of Association history-achievements under a form
of organization and a concept of purpose considerably different from those of today.
The distinguished service record of the Association during those years has been the
foundation on which the present broader and more representative structure has been
brought into being. This volume tells the story of the rise of the American Bar
Association from distinguished but modest beginnings to the attainment of stature as
19381
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an important and useful institution in the domain of law and justice and government.
It rests now with the changed and changing leadership of the Association to determine
whether the substantial achievements of the past sixty years can be surpassed or
matched, under a more democratic government of the Association and a more frequent
consultation of the views of the rank and file of its members. Mrs. Rutherford's
volume is noteworthy not only for its thoroughness in research and skill in the
presentation of material, but also for the timeliness of its appearance, just as the
Association appears to be moving ahead to realize a broadened concept of its functions
and its usefulness. Under present circumstances, as at all times, there is sanity and
force in her admonition: "One of the most effective means of creating a favorable
public opinion is through the performance of a necessary public service. 'If thou
doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?' Genesis 4:7."
WNftmAm L. RAsomf
LAw AND THE MODERN CITY. By Barnet Hodes. Chicago: The Reilly & Lee Co.
1937. pp. 107. $1.00.
This excellent little book by the Corporation Counsel of Chicago was written for
the purpose of clarifying to the average layman the difficulties under which a great
city labors in endeavoring to serve its citizens. It is not a professional text book,
although lawyers may read it with profit.
The author complains, most forcibly, against the passion of legislatures to dominate
cities, not only in their larger affairs, but even in matters of petty administration, and
argues for a form of municipal home rule under which cities will be at liberty to adopt
and amend their own charters and, in general, manage their local affairs with much
of the simplicity and expedition that large business corporations use in the conduct
of their enterprises. Very circumspectly, the author argues that the courts have done
too much in embarrassing cities in dealing with their local problems, and, his Illinois
citations sustain his view.
The chapter on municipal liability in tort is highly informative, but its speculation
based on the majority opinion in Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue1 goes
too far. All that the Brush case really decided was that the salary of the Chief
Engineer of the Bureau of Water Supply of the City of New York was not subject to
Federal income tax, notwithstanding that for purposes of giving redress for wrongs
committed in the course of the City's water supply activities, the defense of "govern-
mental function" was not available. The Brush case does nothing toward dissipating
the fog, that makes municipal liability for wrong, a matter in which each state persists
in its own errors. The most that can be said for the Brush case is that it indicates that
the Supreme Court of the United States will not look with favor upon attempts of the
Federal government to extend the arm of taxation to the salaries of municipal officers
or employees, engaged in public enterprises, which may lawfully be established or
maintained by municipal taxation.
The desire of the author, as chief law officer of a great city, for the maintenance,
if not the extension, of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in tort cases is understand-
able, but there is no truly sound reason why any government should not answer for
the wrongs committed by its agents, almost as a private person is compelled to respond.
The chapter on "The City and the Family of Government" exhibits a state of
affairs in Chicago which makes one marvel at the ingenuity of legislatures in complicat-
ing municipal government. In this chapter the author, also, directs attention to the
t- Member of New York Bar; lately President of the American Bar Association.
1. 300 U. S. 352 (1937).
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new, and previously undreamed of, relationships between the cities and the Federal
government. He takes no stand, but temperately says:2
"Probably it is too early to draw any permanent conclusions. But it is not too early
for those concerned with the proper development of modem cities to keep a weather
eye on this phase of municipal government. We must be eternally alert so that no
new trends or events catch us either napping or drifting aimlessly."
The book is one which every state or municipal legislator should study, and the
caviler at municipal impotence and ineffectiveness will be able to find much in its
pages to enlighten him.
J. Josnpu LnLLyt
TRADE MARX PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING. By Walter J. Derenberg. Albany:
Matthew Bender & Co. 1936. pp. 1162. $20.00.
Lawyers practising in the field of trade regulation are familiar with the vell-known
case of Montgomery v. Thompson.1 There, it is reported that the manufacturer of
the famous "Stone Ale" sought to enjoin a maker of beer who had come to the Town
of Stone and begun to sell his product as "Stone Beer." When the respondent asserted
that a label on his product to the effect that his business was in no way connected with
that of the complainant would obviate any confusion in the public mind, the court
replied pointedly that "Thirsty folk want beer-not explanations." Many text writers
today, seem to have much the same attitude toward the legal profession. They suppose
that the busy attorney is not interested in the explanation of rules of law, at least
historically, and they therefore delete or contract as far as possible the lines devoted
'to exposition of the evolution of legal doctrine. They assume that under the pressure
of practise, the modem counsel loses interest in all else save the present content and
extent of rules of law as the courts enforce them. Hence the increase in the number of
treatises wherein the authors state rules and definitions in their text, list the cases from
the orthodox jurisdictions in a large footnote, those of the heterodox group in a
small footnote-and consider the work done. But Dr. Derenberg proceeds on the
opposite theory in this volume on trade mark protection and unfair trading. He
realizes that the decision of the day is better understood as a link in a chain than as an
isolated phenomenon. So, his emphasis is on the development of the law concerning
which he writes. His approach is that of the historian. On each topic of this excellent
work, he offers to the reader a fresh and interesting presentation of its history, and it is
history that does not appear merely as a stilted sequence of cases, but rather the
development of trends in the law of trading is analyzed and explained.
There is no failure to state the present law. On the contrary, this is done with
precision and thoroughness. His work, therefore, will be most acceptable to lawyers
in the field, because a restatement of their principles has not been comprehensively
attempted since 1929, when Harry D. Nims' text appeared. Many law review
articles by such skilfull writers as the late Frank I. Schecter, Edward Rogers, and
Milton Handler have been written in recent years and many of the theories expressed
in that periodical literature are woven into Dr. Derenberg's work-but law review
articles cannot supply the need for a modem text. This need, Dr. Derenberg's work
is calculated to fill-and it does the task adequately.
More than 270 pages are devoted to the tabulation of state and federal statutes
2. P. 80.
t Former Assistant Corporation Counsel, Head of the Appeals Dividon of New
York City.
1. 41 Ch. D. 47 (1889).
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relating to trade regulations. The various important international conventions in
the field are set out. This increases the practical value of the work. The interesting
notes that Dr. Derenberg adds to his text concerning the practise in foreign countries,
particularly the English method of co-ordinating the courts and the Patent Office will
be helpful to those who are endeavoring to bring order into what Dr. Derenberg calls
the "disorganized" American practise.2 On the doctrine of "secondary meaning " O
and the right to use one's family name as a trade name,4 as well as on the substantive
scope of trade mark registration, 5 Dr. Derenberg's remarks are particularly illuminat-
ing. He has not confined himself to stating cases; he interposes his own criticisms of
the court opinions in many instances. Particularly note his attention to Rosenbcrg
v. Elliott7 and the Yale case s where the Circuit Court of Appeals is accused in the
former case of drawing back in its application of the principles of unfair trading
formerly established and is applauded for the view taken of the doctrine of
"descriptive properties" in the latter case. The interesting criticisms of the author
are the most attractive feature of the work, and, as a result, a reviewer feels at the
conclusion of his reading not at all put out that here he is denied his ordinary privilege
of throwing a few stones.
WILLiAm R. WIT., JR.'
PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAws. By George Wilfred Stumberg. Chicago: The
Foundation Press, Inc. 1937. pp. xl, 441. $5.00.
Professor Stumberg, writing what purports to be a students' textbook, has done much
to remove the objection of factual dearth as one of the arguments of the opponents of
the "text" system of teaching law. His text, as a volume for classroom work is a
superb example of what may be accomplished in this field, and while it may not serve
to stem the increasing abandonment of text method, it should, if others follow its
author's example, serve to better considerably the type of instruction in schools using
the "text" method of instruction.' For the treatment utilized, is essentially factual.
The important and leading cases in the field of Conflict of Laws are treated fully in
the body of the work, and their essential facts carefully considered and weighed.
Principles of legal doctrine are illustrated and illuminated, if not by a summary of
the facts in a reported opinion, by a recitation of hypothetical facts which lead to the
judicial pronouncement of the rule under discussion. This method of approach is the
volume's chief claim to distinction.
Professor Stumberg has integrated his text with the "Restatement of the Law of
Conflicts" by giving, at various points, resum6s of the views of the Restatement on
important and controversial subjects. He has not hesitated to criticize accepted views
and rules, nor to offer suggestions of his own, and in doing this he accomplishes the
2. P. 701.
3. P. 325 et seq.
4. P. 361 et seq.
5. P. 432 et seq.
6. Pp. 434, 436.
7. 7 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1925).
8. Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. (2d) 972 (C.CA. 2d, 1928).
t Lecturer in Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. The case system of teaching, now so widespread, was begun as an heretical innovation
at Harvard Law School in 1871 when Professor Langdell's "Select Cases" was substituted
for Parsons on Contracts. Subsequently Harvard abolished the use of all text books,
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valuable objective of making the reader thoughtful and critical of the views takcn
in the decided cases, too often uncritically accepted by the undiscriminating or busy
student as gospel, and therefore unassailable.
The formal construction of the work suggests several minor objections. Although
there is an adequate index and a complete table of contents, as well as tables of
cases and leading articles, the material wants that nice subdivision into numbered
sections ordinarily employed in legal works. This want detracts from the readiness
with which one may scan the text, not because of the absence of section numbers, but
because the headings of the subdivisions lack conciseness. Instead of indicating the
contents of the subdivision, the headings attempt to summarize the contents. Such
headings seriously lengthen the time of research if found in a text for general use,
and in a students' text their use encourages the practice of reading only the bold type
of the heading. Subdivisions of the text in some places reiterate previously treated
material and occasionally elaborate on it. This detracts from the value the book
might otherwise have as an instrument of occasional research, for the researcher is
prone to look for a complete discussion of one point within one subject heading.
The citation of a disproportionate number of Texas decisions is excusable, for the
author occupies a chair at the University of Texas and no doubt designed the book
for the use of his own students.
As to substance, the author, utilizing a gift for lucid and forceful writing, proceeds
to outline in classic arrangement the body of doctrine that has come to be grouped
under the subject heading Conflict of Laws. He omits, however, a consideration of
the rules regulating taxing jurisdiction, a subject sometimes treated in vorks and
courses in Conflicts. Possibly he felt that material relating to taxing jurisdiction
properly belongs in a work on taxation or constitutional law. Such a position is quite
tenable in view of the situations involved in tax cases, most of which do not require
the application by the forum of the law of another jurisdiction by reason of operative
factual events occurring in that jurisdiction. Yet many of the taxation cases involve
facts in which the domicil of the taxpayer and the legal situs of the taxed property are
in different jurisdictions, and the cases are helpful to indicate the different views
taken of the question of the situs of intangibles when the situs is to be ascertained
for differing purposes.
A short chapter on Legislative Jurisdiction2 reveals the author in his best form so
far as originality of thought and criticism is concerned. In this comparatively un-
developed field there is much room for speculation and original argument. The chapter
is by far the most thought provoking one in the volume. It focuses attention upon
the importance of constitutional principles in the American law of Conflicts,3 and
forcefully points out the constitutional phases of comity in the recognition of the
statute and common law of the states by their sister states. The "commerce" clause
of the Constitution,4 the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 and,
most important, the "full faith and credit" clause0 are shown to require in many
instances, the application by the forum of the lex loci. The doctrine requiring state
courts to recognize the statute law of other states under the "full faith and credit"
clause, has, since the writing of the text, been reinforced by the decision in John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates 7  While considering the "due process"
2. Chapter MI p. 52.
3. Pp. 56, 57.
4. P. S7.
5. P. 58 et seq.
6. P. 61 et seq.
7. 299 U. S. 178 (1936), holding that failure of a Georgia tribunal to interpret an
insurance policy issued in New York according to the New York Statute prccribing what
1933]
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clause in this connection, which has been held to require recognition by the forum of
the common law of sister states,8 the author overlooks the opportunity to point out the
inconsistency of those cases requiring the recognition and enforcement of so-called
"foreign created rights" by state tribunals, with the illogical and untenable doctrine
of Swift v. Tyson,9 reiterated as late as 1928 in Black and White Taxicab and Trans.
portation Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab Co.10
The chapter on domicil occupies a position in the beginning of the text l and lays
a groundwork for subsequent development of the text where problems revolving about
domicil or requiring ascertainment of domicil for their solution, arise. It discusses
the various ways in which domicil is acquired by choice 12 and by operation of law,13
and the effect of status upon domicil.14
The next three chapters treat of jurisdiction,15 judgments'0 and procedure. 17 The
fundamental requirements for in personam,'8 in rem10 and quasi in ren 2o jurisdiction
are discussed and the rules requiring recognition of judgment of sister states and
allowing recognition of other foreign judgments, are stated and commented upon,2 1
The author essays to indicate what rules of law are to be deemed procedural and which
substantive, and gives freely of his own ideas on this important question,2 2 which
many times may be the focal point of a decision.
A discussion of the rules of Conflicts as applied to foreign torts23 is aptly combined
with a consideration of workmens' compensation statutes2 4 and their application. The
rules of Conflicts treat these somewhat similar subjects quite differently, and Professor
Stumberg is quick to point out that workmens' compensation law, though it involves
some of the elements of tort, is grounded largely in contract 20 and hence to be dis-
tinguished from actions ex delicto. He criticizes the undiscriminating application of
the rule which applies to torts the rule of the jurisdiction in which the harmful force
constitutes an invalidating and material misrepresentation, when the New York law is pleaded
and proven, is an unconstitutional judicial act in violation of the "full faith and credit"
clause. Cf. WiLLOuGHB-z, CoNs~rruTrnoNAL LAW (2d ed. 1929) 131; Allen v. Alleghany Co.,
196 U. S. 458 (1905).
8. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357 (1918); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S.
397 (1930); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm., 294 U. S. 532 (1935). Cf.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U. S. 542 (1914).
9. 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842) holding that on questions of general commercial non-statutory
law, the Federal courts need not follow the decisions of the courts of the state wherein the
transactions in issue occurred, but may apply their own rules of law.
10. 276 U. S. 518 (1928).
11. P. 16.
12. P. 18 et seq.
13. P. 30 et seq.
14. P. 38 et seq.
15. P. 66 et seq.
16. P. 106 et seq.
17. P. 128 et seq.
18. P. 69 et seq.
19. P. 99 et seq.
20. P. 101 et seq.
21. P. 107 et seq; p. 124 et seq.
22. P. 148.
23. P. 160 et seq.




first took effect,2 0 and points out its disharmony with social purposes in a number of
situations in which, he believes, it ought to be relaxed. For example, he points to a
situation where the act causing injury is lawful or even required to be done in the
jurisdiction where it is performed, but tortious in the place where the injuries are
suffered.27 He indicates that the question of survival of personal injury actions is
closely connected with estate administration and that the law of the decedent's
domicil should determine liability.2 Likewise he feels that the effect of marriage on
tort liability should be a matter of domicillary law.2-
The apparent confusion, even among decisions of a given state tribunal on the
rules governing validity, interpretation and form of contracts makes it difficult indeed
for an author who is essaying to be more than a case digester to point to any rationale
in the decisions or to try to reconcile them.30 Professor Stumberg tries to do none
of these things, but points out the wide variance among the decisions, 0' and discusses
and illustrates the principal rules upon which courts have seized to govern the
validity of contracts, and other problems which have arisen relating to various phases
of contract law.32 He indicates that some of these seemingly irreconcilable decisions
of the courts of a given jurisdiction may be to some extent reconciled when close
analysis reveals that some of them present problems concerning capacity, some
problems involving form, and others involving interpretation. 3 The cases applying the
three principal rules, that is, lex lod contractus, lex loci solutionis, and the rule of
express or implied intention are stated and criticized. The last of these rule is
treated under two separate headings by the author: "Intention of the parties" and
"The law which upholds the contract. ' 3 4 This last heading, it is the belief of this
reviewer, is better viewed as part of the "intention" rule, for it is based upon the
reasoning that no one intends entering into an invalid agreement, and hence the
intent that the law which upholds the agreement shall apply, is implied.
The last six chapters of the text are concerned with status and domestic relations,
business organizations, real and personal property law, and the law of decedents'
estates, as affected by the rules of private international law.
The book covers vast territory in its four hundred and thirty-one pages of actual
text, and its coverage, while not sketchy, must of necessity be general. It should, if
properly used, serve to prepare the student with a working background for any problems
that may arise in later practice involving the conflict of laws, and it should leave him
with the same impression as that with which it left this reviewer in reinforcement of
his belief, that the law of Conflicts is a subject bestrevm with thorny inconsistencies
and with problems trying to one's reason, and in many instances is but an arbitrary
code of regulations based upon a need for expediency and dogmatic rule rather than
a need for abstract justice.
SATUEL J. WAlM'st
26. P. 182 et seq.
27. P. 182.
2S. P. 1S6.
29. Pp. 1S6, 187.
30. See GoomaicH, Corucr or LAws (1927) 228; 2 BrALr, Co:-rLicr or L-mws (1935)
1077.
31. P. 200.
32. P. 201 et seq. (place of making) ; p. 207 et seq. (place of performance) ; p. 209 et zeq.
(intention of the parties) ; p. 212 et seq. (law which upholds the contract).
33. P. 215.
34. See note 32, supra.
t Member of the New York Bar. Former Legislation Editor, Forwm,-t Lwv: RExrw.
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